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Comment on Valentini, “De Broglie-Bohm
Pilot-Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?”
Harvey R Brown∗
Abstract
Valentini has recently defended the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave version
of quantum theory from the claim that it is essentially Everett theory
encumbered with the redundant postulation of point particles. In this
note, Valentini’s central arguments are questioned.
1 Introduction
What a privilege it is to be invited to reply to Antony Valentini’s paper.1
If anyone is capable of persuading me of the plausibility of the pilot-wave
picture of quantum reality, it is he. But I am not convinced that his
defense of pilot-wave theory from the accusation that it is really Everett
theory encumbered with otiose ontology (which Valentini calls the Claim)
is successful. In the space available, I cannot do justice to all of his
arguments, so I will restrict myself to what I take to be the central ones.
On a number of occasions in his paper, Valentini stresses the philo-
sophical point that theories should be assessed on their own terms — that
it is unfair to criticize a theory for failing to concur with assumptions that
“make sense only in rival theories”. Valentini argues that the Everett and
pilot-wave pictures differ on their own terms for several reasons.
First, the “correct and natural viewpoint” about pilot-wave ontology is
that which Valentini attributes to de Broglie, according to which physical
systems, apparatuses, people, etc., are built from the configuration vari-
able q. In particular, all macroscopic, observable phenomena, including
the very stuff of our mental sensations, supervene on the configurations of
the punctiform corpuscles hypothesized to co-exist with the wave-function
(pilot-wave). Although it is not clear that this viewpoint — let us call
it the matter assumption — is common to all variants of the de Broglie-
Bohm approach, as Valentini admits in section 32, modern disagreements
within the camp do seem to concentrate on distinct issues such as the
reality or otherwise of the pilot-wave, or whether the appropriate formu-
lation of the corpuscle dynamics is first- or second-order. Second, and
more significantly, Valentini stresses the role of non-equilibrium statistics
in (his own version of) pilot-wave theory. This allows him to assert that
the theory is “not a mere alternative formulation of quantum theory”.
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1Valentini’s paper [1], along with the present reply, will appear in [2].
2In Bohm’s 1952 work it would seem that the role of the corpuscles in the measurement con-
text is indexical, picking out the relevant component of the wavefunction that itself describes
macroscopic physical systems; see [3].
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Finally, Valentini provides a “counter-claim”, to the effect that the
Everett picture is motivated by erroneous reasoning, and thus is unlikely
to be true. In what follows, I will discuss each of these arguments in turn.
2 Assessing pilot-wave theory on its own
terms
A key passage in the paper occurs at the end of the discussion in section
6 of the role of decoherence in the physics of the measurement process.
Of course, . . . , if one wishes one may identify the flow with a set
of trajectories representing parallel (approximately classical)
worlds, as in the decoherence-based approach to many worlds
of Saunders and Wallace. This is fair enough from a many-
worlds point of view. But if we start from pilot-wave theory
understood on its own terms, there is no motivation for doing
so: such a step would amount to a reification of mathematical
structure (assigning reality to all the trajectories asociated with
the velocity field at all points in phase space). If one does so
reify, one has constructed a different physical theory, with a
different ontology: one may do so if one wishes, but from a
pilot-wave perspective there is no special reason to take this
step.
The trouble is that this argument looks more like a restatement of the
rival positions than a critical comparison of them, or at any rate a defense
of the pilot-wave from the Claim. At the risk of belabouring this point,
let me tell a story.
Prof X has just published the latest version of his dualist philosophy of
mind, which lies somewhere between solipsism and skepticism concerning
other minds. Prof X hypothesizes the existence of a mental substance
attached to his own person—he sees no other way of accounting for his
own consciousness, and qualia in particular. But he rejects solipsism and
Berkeleian idealism, believing in the existence of an external material
world including other persons. And through a questionable application of
Ockham’s razor, Prof X argues he can save appearances by denying mental
substances, and hence (in his view) consciousness, to persons other than
himself. Others may act as if they were conscious, but there was no need
to go so far as to postulate that they actually are conscious.3 In her
response, Prof X’s arch critic, Prof Y, reiterates a point made widely in
the literature, namely that to account for his own consciousness, Prof X
need not appeal to dualism and the existence of mental substance; he
could avail himself of a materialist, functionalist theory of mind. Were he
to do this, Prof X would of course have to conclude he lives in a world
with many minds. But Prof X rebuts Prof Y as follows:
Of course, if one wishes one may take the view that the be-
haviour and physical constitution of other persons are jointly
evidence for the existence of other minds. This is fair enough
from the point of view of a functionalist philosophy of mind.
But if we start from my dualist theory understood on its own
3This story may not be as contrived as it might seem. If one adopts van Fraassen’s
constructive empiricism, it is not entirely clear, to me at least, how any agent is supposed to
avoid agnosticism about the existence of other minds.
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terms, there is no motivation for doing so: such a step would
amount to postulating unnecessary entities. If one does so pos-
tulate, one has constructed a different theory, with a different
ontology: one may do so if one wishes, but from my dualist
perspective there is no special reason to take this step.
Well, functionalists like Prof Y would be forgiven for feeling a degree
of frustration at this reply. Their basic claim is that dualism is unneces-
sary for consciousness, and therefore that Prof X’s argument, rather than
exploiting Ockham’s razor, violates it ab initio. If they are reasonable,
functionalists should expect debate on their basic claim (which cannot be
regarded as obviously true), but they will naturally regard Prof X’s asser-
tion that they are failing to assess his theory on its own terms as beside
the point.
The analogy in pilot-wave theory to dualism, and in particular to men-
tal substance, in this story is obviously the matter assumption. Why im-
pose it? Why is it necessary within quantum mechanics to understand
the nature of physical systems, apparatuses, people, etc., in terms of con-
figurations of hypothetical point corpuscles? If it can be shown that the
wave-function or pilot-wave is structured enough to do the job, why go
further?
For many workers in quantum mechanics, the answer is clear: because
without further ado unitary quantum theory faces the measurement prob-
lem. Quantum mechanics generically predicts a superposed state widely
interpreted as a bizarre schizophrenia of distinct measurement outcomes.
Pilot-wave theory by way of the matter assumption restores sanity, or at
any rate a single definite measurement outcome.4 But is it necessary to
follow this route?
If the object of the exercise is to save the appearances, it is not ob-
viously so. Everettians plausibly claim that the multiplicity of outcomes
(in the sense defined by the Saunders-Wallace decoherence analysis of the
superposed wavefunction) is not actually schizophrenia in any observable
sense; it is consistent with experience.
If both Everett and pilot-wave theories save the appearances, it might
seem that choosing between them is a question of taste. But this would
be misleading. Let us consider the case of advocates of the view that
the pilot-wave is physically real (such as Valentini himself). The onus is
on such advocates not just to justify the introduction of structure over
and above the wavefunction on configuration space. The further onus is
to explain how the matter assumption even makes sense in the light of
the possibility that the wavefunction is sufficiently highly-structured on
its own to account for physical systems, apparatuses, people, etc. After
all, it is hard to see how the process of adding further degrees of freedom,
hidden or otherwise, in the theory does anything to detract from the
wavefunction’s potency in this sense. What is really needed is an argument
to the effect that the wavefunction does not have such potency as the
4Valentini complains in section 3 that the recent critique of pilot-wave theory by Brown
and Wallace [3] is “framed as if the measurement problem were the prime motivation for
considering pilot-wave theory in the first place. As a matter of historical fact, this is false.”
Indeed, much of the historical discussion in [3] purports to show that Bohm was unaware of
the measurement problem in 1952. But it is hard to imagine a more significant selling-point
for pilot-wave theory than its supposed ability to solve the measurement problem, whatever
de Broglie’s and Bohm’s original motivations were.
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Everettians attribute to it.5
Valentini goes some way to addressing this crucial matter at two points
in his paper.
At the end of section 5 of his paper, a hydrogen atom in a superposition
of two ‘Ehrenfest’ packets is discussed, and appeal is made to the possibil-
ity of a subquantum measurement designed to establish which component
in the superposition is “unoccupied”. For present purposes, the likelihood
of such a measurement being possible (see below) is largely irrelevant, the
question being what the status of such a component is in itself. Accord-
ing to Valentini, the unoccupied component is merely “simulating” the
approximately classical motion of the atom. Valentini further claims in
section 6 that the treatment of the analogous, and more pressing, case of
a superposition of non-overlapping packets representing distinct macro-
scopic arrangements is conceptually just the same. But in both cases,
this notion of simulation is hard to reconcile with the plausible claim
that, even in pilot-wave theory taken on its own terms, the intrinsic prop-
erties of quantum systems such as mass (both inertial and gravitational),
charge and magnetic moment pertain to (at least) the pilot-wave.6 If in
the second case the macroscopic systems involve contain human observers,
and the superposition is defined relative to the appropriate decoherence
basis, it is hard to see why phenomenologically the unoccupied component
does not have the same status as it does in the Everett picture.7
Further clarification is offered by Valentini in his section 7, where
he question’s Wallace’s 2003 account [8] of the phenomenology of the
wavefunction in terms of Dennett’s notion of macro-objects as patterns.
Valentini admits that in the quantum equilibrium regime, approximately
classical experimenters “will encounter a phenomenological appearance of
many worlds just as they will encounter a phenomenological appearance
of locality, uncertainty, and of quantum physics generally.”8 He again
appeals to the possibility of subquantum measurements in the nonequi-
librium regime to question the explanatory and predictive role of such
patterns reified by Everettians. But the reality of these patterns is not
like locality and uncertainty, which are ultimately statistical notions and
are supposed to depend on whether equilibrium holds. The patterns, on
the other hand, are features of the wavefunction and are either there or
they are not, regardless of the equilibrium condition.
5In Holland [4], it is merely claimed that the wavefunction fails to have both “form and
substance” (see the discussion in [3]). A more sustained argument was offered recently by
Maudlin [5] in the context of any “bare” GRW-type theory of spontaneous collapse, which of
course is just as vulnerable as Everett theory to this kind of objection—such as it is.
6See [6] and [7].
7A further plausibility argument to the effect that such an unoccupied component of the
superposition has the “credentials” to represent a bona fide measurement outcome in standard
pilot-wave theory is found in [3]; the generalization of the argument to pilot-wave theory with
regimes of non-equilibrium statistics is, I believe, straightforward. A critique of the credentials
argument is found in [9].
8The phrase “phenomenological appearance of many worlds” is perhaps unhappy; the whole
point of the Everett account of measurement is to demonstrate that the multiplicity of worlds
is dynamically unavoidable but effectively unobservable, thus saving appearances! I take it,
however, that what Valentini means here is that in the equilibrium regime, whatever one says
about the significance of the wavefunction in Everett theory, one can say about the pilot-wave
in pilot-wave theory. Valentini’s position is quite different from Lewis’ recent defence [9] of
pilot-wave theory, which involves simply rejecting Dennett’s treatment of macro-objects as
patterns (even in the equilibrium regime), but for no better reason than that it saves the day.
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3 Non-equilibrium statistics
A theme running throughout Valentini’s paper is that pilot-wave theory
cannot be a mere alternative formulation of quantum theory, or a sort
of Everett theory in denial, because it allows for nonequilibrium physics.
Indeed, we have just seen that Valentini effectively concedes that equi-
librium pilot-wave theory is not a serious rival to Everett theory. But I
argued in the last section that what is essential in the Everett picture,
namely the analysis of the structural properties of the wavefunction and
its ramifications for the measurement problem—what Wallace is striving
to articulate in his metaphor of patterns in the context of decoherence—
, is untouched by the possibility of an additional ontology of corpuscles
whether distributed in equilibrium or not. If the analysis is correct, it
has implications for pilot-wave theory (or that version in which the pilot-
wave is real) and bare GRW-type theories just as much as for the Everett
picture. Valentini is, I think, not justified in ignoring the potency of the
wavefunction in the nonequilibrium regime.
In fact, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the very notion of
nonequilibrium quantum physics is problematic. If the wavefunction is
indeed potent in the relevant sense, there are strong decision-theoretic
arguments to the effect that rational observers should expect Born statis-
tics.9 It is not just that de Broglie-Bohm corpuscles are surplus to re-
quirement. Their irrelevance to the issue of defining what measurement
outcomes are means that their contingent distribution should pose no
threat to the Born rule. Needless to say, if, as Valentini hopes, we were
eventually to observe strange nonlocal phenomena associated with, say,
relic particles that decoupled soon after the big bang, Everettians would
have to throw in the towel. But pilot-wave theorists who treat the wave-
function as part of physical, and not just nomological, reality, should, it
seems to me, be doubtful about this possibility — unless they can show
where the Everettians have gone wrong.
4 The Counter-Claim
Valentini claims that Everett theory, indeed Everett’s own 1957 think-
ing, is motivated by the “puzzle of superposition”, which in turn stems
from the notion of “eigenvalue realism”—itself allegedly based on classical
reasoning.
The argument has several strands and is not easy to summarize con-
cisely. But let us first consider the issue of what a measurement is in
quantum mechanics. Valentini is surely right: the choice of an interaction
Hamiltonian qua measurement must ultimately be legitimized by quan-
tum, not classical, considerations. But how does one begin? What does
one mean by an observable in the first place? What makes a given inter-
action a “measurement” of that observable? And how does treatment of
the measurement process tie in both with the dynamical principles in the
theory and the rules governing stochastic behaviour, if any? The matter
is intricate, and depends on diverse aspects of the theory.
9See the chapter by Wallace, this volume [2]; and strong arguments showing that rational
observers will empirically confirm the Born rule are found in the chapter by Greaves and
Myrvold, this volume [2]. Such arguments suggest that Everett theory is more Popperian
than pilot-wave theory a` la Valentini: it is more falsifiable because it rules out nonequilibrium
physics in the very special regimes where Valentini thinks it is likely, but not certain.
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At the beginning of section 8, Valentini stresses that his critique of
eigenvalue realism “does not depend on pilot-wave theory”, which leaves
the matter somewhat ill-defined. Exactly what version of quantum theory
is in play? In the middle of section 8, Valentini states that it is “much
more likely that a new domain will be better understood in terms of a new
theory based on new concepts, with its own new theory of measurement –
as shown by the example of general relativity, and indeed by the example
of de Broglie’s nonclassical dynamics”. Yet recall that Bohm in his 1952
version of pilot-wave theory availed himself of standard quantum measure-
ment theory, at least as regards the choice of interaction Hamiltonians and
the definition of observables.
Valentini, however, emphasizes in section 3 that the semantics of mea-
surement in pilot-wave theory (equilibrium or otherwise) is quite different
from that in classical mechanics. But that is also largely true for orthodox
quantum theory. It is widely accepted in quantum theory that generically
one is not measuring what is already there, one is not revealing a pre-
existing element of reality—unless, perhaps, when prior to measurement
the system is in an eigenstate of the observable in question. In that special
case, eigenvalue realism is very close to what in the philosophical litera-
ture is called the Eigenstate Eigenvalue Link, which in turn is very close
in spirit to the 1935 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen sufficient criterion for the
existence of an element of physical reality. The common notion here is
that if theory predicts that measurement of some observable will yield a
certain value with probability one, then the measurement must be reveal-
ing a property of the system that was already there. If this is right (which
I doubt), then what one is supposed to infer in the generic case where
the pre-measurement state is not an eigenstate is to some extent open to
discussion. But it is not obvious how to avoid value-fuzziness in this case
and hence a version of the puzzlement of superposition in the context of
the measurement process.
Like Valentini, I think that eigenvalue realism is questionable — even
in the absence of hidden variables. But this does not remove the the need
to make sense of the superposition in the context of measurement, and Ev-
erettians do not appeal to any classical prejudices in doing so. Valentini’s
further argument is that Everett theory is unlikely to be true because its
followers are first led to the puzzlement of superposition on the basis of
eigenvalue realism.10 Even if he were right about Everettians, the argu-
ment strikes me as unconvincing. First, successful theories are sometimes
developed partly on the basis of misguided or questionable motivations.
(Amongst the principal ideas driving the development of general relativ-
ity were a dubious version of Mach’s principle, and the erroneous notion
that the principle of general covariance represents a generalization of the
relativity principle.) Second, and perhaps more pertinently, a successful
theory may be developed in part to solve a long-standing conceptual prob-
lem, and in the process of doing so show precisely how the the original
assumptions leading to the problem are ill-founded.
10To be fair, Valentini is, consciously or otherwise, turning on its head the 1986 Deutsch
argument cited in (Valentini’s) section 3 against the plausibility of pilot-wave theory based
on its allegedly suspect motivation.
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